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COMMENT

GOOD RIDDANCE TO GOOD FAITH?:
DECIPHERING MONTANA'S NEW TEST FOR
SUBFACIAL CHALLENGES TO SEARCH WARRANT
AFFIDAVITS
PETER WILLIAM MICKELSON

I.

INTRODUCTION

Before Franks v. Delaware,1 challenges to search warrants
were limited, procedurally, to the facial sufficiency of the
supporting affidavits. 2 In Franks, the United States Supreme
Court removed this restriction by allowing defendants to
challenge not only the adequacy of probable cause, but also the
veracity of the information contained within affidavit
statements. 3 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,
suggested that inherent within the Fourth Amendment is the
1. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
2. Edward G. Mascolo, Controverting an Informant's Factual Basis for a Search
Warrant: Franks v. Delaware Revisited and Rejected Under Connecticut Law, 15
QuINNIPIAc L. REV. 65, 66-74 (1995) (citing Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41
(1933); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213
(1983)).
3. 438 U.S. at 155 (stating: "[t]his case presents an important and longstanding
issue of Fourth Amendment law. Does a defendant in a criminal proceeding ever have
the right, under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, subsequent to the ex parte
issuance of a search warrant, to challenge the truthfulness of factual statements made in
an affidavit supporting the warrant?").
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presumption that defendants may question the factual basis of
4
probable cause determinations made by magistrate judges.
Noting that a magistrate, alone, makes these decisions,
Blackmun declared, "it would be an unthinkable imposition
upon his authority if a warrant affidavit, revealed after the fact
to contain a deliberately or recklessly false statement, were to
stand beyond impeachment."5 With this presumption, the Court
fashioned a test for challenges to affidavit statements whereby a
defendant need show that the statements were deliberately false
Upon a
or made with reckless disregard for the truth.6
successful challenge, the reviewing court may excise the
statements from the supporting affidavit, and void the warrant
7
if the remaining information does not establish probable cause.
By carving out a routine for bringing and reviewing
subfacial challenges,8 the Franks test seemed to broaden the
scope of the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures. A slightly more sophisticated assessment
of Franks, however, recognizes that, while expanding the
parameters of the Fourth Amendment, the decision also
reinforced traditional search and seizure maxims: namely, those
common interpretations of probable cause as a fluid concept, and
the exclusionary rule as a tool for deterrence. Specifically, the
intent requirement of the Franks test carries with it the
understanding that probable cause requires something less than
precision, and that good faith can wash the stain of bad
information. In other words, the intent requirement acts as a
necessary limitation to the Franks test because it disallows
4. Id. at 168, 171.
5. Id. at 165.
6. Id. at 155-56.
7. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) (stating:
[w]here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false
statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the
truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly
false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth
Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request. In the
event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is
established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the
affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is
insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and
the fruits of the search excluded .... ).
8. Mascolo provides an intelligible explanation of these somewhat unintelligible
terms, explaining that, while facial challenges to search warrants "question the
sufficiency of probable cause in the supporting affidavits[,]" sub-facial challenges "argue
that while there is surface sufficiency to establish probable cause, in fact, no such cause
ever existed." Mascolo, supra note 2, at 75.
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subfacial challenges when the motives of affiants are not in
question.
For more than two decades, and in nearly every federal and
state jurisdiction, Franks has served as the recognized standard
for subfacial challenges. 9 Recently, in State v. Worrall,10 the
Montana Supreme Court broke from this federal model, and
modified the Franks test by eliminating the requirement that a
defendant show a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for
the truth. In the simplest terms, Worrall permits defendants to
challenge search warrants solely on the basis of inaccuracies
contained in supporting affidavits."
9. See, e.g., United States v. Melvin, 596 F.2d 492, 498 (1st Cir. 1979); United
States v. Moore, 968 F.2d 216, 220 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Calisto, 838 F.2d 711,
714 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d 174, 176 (4th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Namer, 680 F.2d 1088, 1092-93 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Charles, 138
F.3d 257, 263 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. McNeese, 901 F.2d 585, 594 (7th Cir.
1190); United States v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Davis,
663 F.2d 824, 830 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1297-98
(10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Burston, 154 F.3d 1328, 1333-34 (11th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 662-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Sims v. State, 587 So. 2d
1271, 1274-75 (Ala. 1991); Atkinson v. State, 869 P.2d 486, 492 (Alaska 1994); State v.
Buccini, 810 P.2d 178, 182 (Ariz. 1991); Langford v. State, 962 S.W.2d 358, 362 (Ark.
1998); People v. Costello, 204 Cal. App. 3d 431, 440-41 (1988); State v. Glenn, 740 A.2d
856, 863 (Conn. 1999); Barr v. State, 571 A.2d 786, 786 (Del. 1989); Johnson v. State, 660
So. 2d 648, 655 (Fla. 1995); Ross v. State, 314 S.E.2d 674, 676 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); State
v. Navas, 911 P.2d 1101, 1107 (Haw. 1995); State v. Linder, 592 P.2d 852, 856 (Idaho
1979); People v. Verdone, 479 N.E.2d 925, 927-28 (111.1985); Utley v. State, 589 N.E.2d
232, 236 (Ind. 1992); State v. Paterno, 309 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Iowa 1981); State v.
Jacques, 587 P.2d 861, 866 (Kan. 1978); Commonwealth v. Walker, 729 S.W.2d 440, 443
(Ky. 1987); State v. Bouffanie, 364 So. 2d 971, 977 (La. 1978); State v. Hamel, 634 A.2d
1272, 1273-74 (Me. 1993); Wilson v. State, 752 A.2d 1250, 1265-66 (Md. 2000);
Commonwealth v. Lane, 571 N.E.2d 603, 607 (Mass. 1991); People v. Mackay, 329
N.W.2d 476, 479 (Mich. 1982); State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 105 (Minn. 1989); Bevill
v. State, 556 So. 2d 699, 713 (Miss. 1990); State v. Dawson, 985 S.W.2d 941, 950-51 (Mo.
1999); State v. Stickelman, 299 N.W.2d 520, 524 (Neb. 1980); Doyle v. State, 995 P.2d
465, 472 (Nev. 2000); State v. Carroll, 552 A.2d 69, 76-77 (N.H. 1988); Siligato v. State,
632 A.2d 837, 841 (N.J. 1993); People v. Fernandez, 990 P.2d 224, 228-29 (N.M. 1999);
People v. Griffin, 651 N.Y.S.2d 645, 647 (N.Y. 1996); State v. Barnes, 430 S.E.2d 223,
228 (N.C. 1993); State v. Clark, 1993 WL 216319 at *5; State v. Jones, 739 N.E.2d 300,
312 (Ohio 2000); Lee v. State, 661 P.2d 1345, 1352 (Okla. 1983); State v. Modrell-Lydall,
876 P.2d 316, 317 (1994) (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 133.693 (1994)); Commonwealth v.
Bradshaw, 434 A.2d 181, 182-83 (Pa. 1993); State v. DeMagistris, 714 A.2d 567, 574 (R.I.
1998); State v. Missouri, 524 S.E.2d 394, 397 (S.C. 1999); State v. Habbena, 372 N.W.2d
450, 456 (S.D. 1985); State v. Cannon, 634 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tenn. 1982); Dancy v. State,
728 S.W.2d 772, 78-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); State v. Moore, 788 P.2d 525, 528-29
(Utah 1990); State v. Demers, 707 A.2d 276, 278 (Vt. 1997); Williams v. Commonwealth,
496 S.E.2d 113, 116 (Va. 1998); State v. Wilke, 778 P.2d 1054, 1059-60 (Wash. 1989);
State v. Thompson, 358 S.E.2d 815, 817-18 (W. Va. 1987); State v. Mitchell, 424 N.W.2d
698, 700-01 (Wis. 1988); Davis v. State, 859 P.2d 89, 93 (Wyo. 1993).
10. 1999 MT 55, 293 Mont. 439, 976 P.2d 968.
11. Id. at 1 32-33.
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Justifying this modification of the Franks test, the Montana
court concluded that "[d]ivining the intent of the search warrant
applicant is irrelevant; misstatements and inaccuracies,
whether intentional or unintentional, may produce the same
constitutionally impermissible result-a search based upon
something other than probable cause." 12 At its core, Worrall
stands for the practical notion that the integrity of a criminal
prosecution depends on the fair and just execution of all its
parts, including, and importantly, the warrant issuing process.
However, as a consequence of this ideal, Worrall also contains
an implicit rejection of those "traditional search and seizure
maxims" which Franks so carefully preserved. By removing the
intent requirement of the Franks test, the court implied that
affidavits meant to establish probable cause must be free from
error, and that the good faith of affiants will no longer factor
into determinations of whether inaccuracies should be excised
from search warrant affidavits.
The following comment will critique these revisions of the
probable cause standard and exclusionary rule, as expressed in
the Montana court's decision to modify the Franks test. For the
sake of context, the comment will first examine the conceptual
foundations of the Franks test, and, specifically, the
conventional view of probable cause and the exclusionary rule as
necessary limitations to subfacial challenges. In addition, the
comment will argue that Montana's view of probable cause and
the exclusionary rule are not so different from that of the United
States Supreme Court as to require a modification of the Franks
test. On this basis, the comment will conclude that, because of
these similar views, Worrall's removal of the intent requirement
of the Franks test was less than reasonable.
Finally, the
comment will offer an alternative explanation of Worrall as a
symbol of the Montana court's ongoing effort to reconcile
established search and seizure doctrines with Article II, sections
10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution.
II. THE LIMITED SCOPE OF THE FRANKS TEST
In Franks, the United States Supreme Court imposed a
twofold limitation on the availability and application of subfacial
challenges. Tempering the general rule that defendants may
scrutinize the integrity of search warrant affidavits, the Court

12.

Id. at

33.
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acknowledged the possibility that veracity hearings would
undermine the leniency of the probable cause standard and the
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. 13 Conceding that
neither "of these considerations is trivial[,]" the Court limited
the scope of the Franks test "both in regard to when exclusion of
the seized evidence is mandated, and when a hearing on
14
allegations of misstatements must be accorded."
A. The Probable Cause Standardin Franks
The meaning of the Fourth Amendment 5 is plain:
reasonable searches require warrants, and warrants require
probable cause.' 6 The effect of the amendment, though not
13. 438 U.S. at 165-67. (The Court weighed these six arguments advanced by the
State of Delaware:
that the exclusionary rule.. .is not a personal constitutional right, but only a
judicially created remedy extended where its benefit as a deterrent promises to
outweigh the societal cost of its use... [;J that a citizen's privacy interests are
adequately protected by a requirement that applicants for a warrant submit a
sworn affidavit and by the magistrate's independent determination of
sufficiency based on the face of the affidavit ... [;] that the magistrate already is
equipped to conduct a fairly vigorous inquiry into the accuracy of the factual
affidavit supporting a warrant application... [;] that it would unwisely
diminish the solemnity and moment of the magistrates proceeding to make his
inquiry into probable cause... [;] that permitting a post-search evidentiary
hearing on issues of veracity would confuse the pressing issue of guilt or
innocence with the collateral question as to whether there had been official
misconduct in the drafting of the affidavit... [;] and that a post-search veracity
challenge is inappropriate because the accuracy of an affidavit in large part is
beyond the control of the affiant.).
14. Id. at 167.
15.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and persons
or things to be seized.).
16. Though the warrant requirement is not without exceptions, the Court has
pushed for the diligent use of warrants in searches. See JOHN WESLEY HALL, SEARCH
AND SEIZuRE 68 n.7 (2000) (citing United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15 (1948); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S.
493, 497-99 (1958); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 613-16 (1961); Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-13 (1964); Camara v. Municipal. Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S.
523, 532 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-59 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20 (1968); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969); Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410, 415 (1969); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55
(1971); United States v. United States Dist. Court for E. Dist., 407 U.S. 297, 316-317
(1972); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1977); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 395 (1978); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758 (1979); Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 602 (1980); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211-22 (1981); Illinois v.
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explicit, is an equally permanent creation of the federal and
state courts, which have recognized, since 1914, that evidence
seized in violation of the warrant requirement 17 is subject to the
exclusionary rule, and inadmissible at trial.'8 In turn, the
requirement of probable cause provides the means for avoiding
the exclusionary rule, while warrants that fall short of the
standard for establishing probable cause are generally
considered facially insufficient. In Brinegar v. United States,19
the Supreme Court characterized probable cause as a d6tente, of
sorts, between two inimical interests: the right to privacy, and
the need for effective law enforcement. 20 Probable cause,
according to Brinegar, is "the best compromise that has been
found for accommodating these often opposed interests.
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement; to allow
less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the
officers' whim or caprice." 2'
On at least two occasions, since Brinegar, the Supreme
Court revised the test for reviewing the adequacy of probable
23
cause: once, in Aguilar v. Texas 22 and Spinelli v. United States,
and, then, in Illinois v. Gates.24 Drawing from earlier forms of
the probable cause standard, the Court announced, in Aguilar, a
two-prong test for evaluating an informant's tip for veracity and
basis of knowledge. 25 Under Aguilar, an affidavit, if based on an
informant's tip, established probable cause if the affidavit
included
information
that
supported
the
informant's
Gates, 462 U.S. U.S. 213, 236 (1983); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984).
17. The Fourth Amendment is the whole of two parts: the warrant requirement
and the probable cause requirement. The prohibitive language that protects "the people"
from "unreasonable searches and seizures" establishes the warrant requirement. U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
18. The United States Supreme Court first articulated the exclusionary rule in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), and affixed the rule to the fifty states
in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
19. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
20. See id. at 176.
21. Id. at 176; see also, Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)
(endorsing the notion that a finite definition of probable cause is the key to this trade off,
the Court declined to adopt a test of "reasonable police conduct under the
circumstances[,]" and held that "[a] single, familiar standard is essential to guide police
officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and
individual interests involved in specific circumstances they confront.").
22. 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (construing Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486
(1958)).
23. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
24. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
25. 378 U.S. at 114.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/5

6

2001

SEARCH
AFFIDAVITS
Mickelson:WARRANT
Good Riddance
to Good Faith?

conclusions, as well as the affiant's belief in the informant's
credibility. 26 Affirming Aguilar in Spinelli, the Court added
that, if one of the Aguilar requirements was incomplete,
probable cause could be established if "the informer was
generally trustworthy and that he made his charge.. .on the
basis of information obtained in a reliable way."27 Fundamental
to this test was the presumption that the integrity of the
warrant issuing process hinges on the ability of magistrates to
make
independent
and
objective
probable
cause
28
determinations.
The current definition of the probable cause standard, now
twenty years old, was articulated in Illinois v. Gates.29 Rejecting
the rigid analysis of Aguilar-Spinelli,30 the Supreme Court
turned to the more flexible totality of the circumstances test,
which requires a common sense determination of whether the
totality of the circumstances set forth in an affidavit suggest
that the search of a particular place will yield particular
evidence. 31 In Gates, the warrant to search the defendants'
Bloomingdale home was issued on the basis of an anonymous
letter warning of the defendants' scheme to run drugs between
Florida and Illinois. The trial court vacated the warrant for
failing to specify the informant's veracity or basis of
knowledge. 32 However, on certiorari review, the Court held that
the letter was detailed enough to make up for its lack of
authentication. 33 The Court acknowledged the relevance of the
informant's veracity and basis of knowledge, but added that
"these elements should not be understood as entirely separate
and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every
case."34 Accordingly, under Gates, the veracity and basis of
knowledge prongs of Aguilar-Spinelli merely "illuminat[e]"
26. Id. at 114-15.
27. 393 U.S. at 417.
28. According to Mascolo, the Court's attention to the role of magistrates in
Aguilar was a "reaction" to the likelihood that often "probable cause inquiries [were]
compromised by magistrates who were paying undue deference to claims of probable
cause by law enforcement officers that were not supported by a substantial factual
basis." See Mascolo, supra note 2, at 71.
29. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
30. Id. at 238.
31. Id. at 230-31 (stating: "[tihis totality-of-the-circumstances approach is far more
consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause than is any rigid demand that
specific 'tests' be satisfied by every informant's tip.").
32. Id. at 213.
33. Id. at 238-39.
34. Id. at 230.
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probable cause determinations. 35
Gates proposed that the requirements of reliability and
basis of knowledge are fundamental only in the sense that
36
deficiencies in each will result in inadequate probable cause.
Conversely, if only one of the factors is sketchy-or even
absent-the strength of the other factor might compensate. In
short, Gates affirmed the interpretation of probable cause as "a
fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in
particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully,
reduced to a neat set of legal rules."37

The validity of an

affidavit, according to the Court, turns not on one prong of a
two-prong test, but on a combination of inquiries directed at
predicting the outcome of a search.
Though Gates seemed to suggest that magistrates have free
reign to play fast and loose with the probable cause standard,
the totality of the circumstances test is not entirely subjective. 38
The test requires more than conclusions, 39 and carries much of
40
the same regiment articulated in Aguilar and Spinelli.
Moreover, Gates affirmed the particulars of the warrant issuing
process, 41 emphasizing, again, the role of a magistrate in making
probable cause determinations. 42 The Court's decision embraced
35. Id. at 230 (preferring that the veracity and reliability requirements "be
understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the
commonsense, practical question whether there is 'probable cause' to believe that
contraband or evidence is located in a particular place.").
36. Id. at 239.
37. Id. at 238-39.
38. Dissenting in Gates, Justice Brennan argued that the fluidity of the totality of
the circumstances test marred the role of magistrates as "independent arbiter[s] of
probable cause" by impeding the authority of magistrates to "draw reasonable
inferences.. .from the material supplied... by applicants for [ warrants." Id. at 239.
The majority countered Justice Brennan's argument, commenting that by rejecting
Aguilar and Spinelli, Gates did not necessarily prohibit magistrates from "exact[ing]
such assurances as they deem necessary... in making probable-cause determinations."
Id. at 240.
39. Id. at 239.
40. Id.
41. The Court agreed that "[an affidavit must provide a magistrate with a
substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause[;]" and that "[s]ufficient
information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine
probable cause." In addition, the Court stated that "[i]n order to ensure that such an
abdication of the magistrate's duty does not occur, court's must continue to
conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are issued." Id. at
213, 239.
42. Id. at 236 (citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1983), and
stating "we have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency
of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate's 'determination
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the idea that probable cause requires specific facts, including a
description of the place to be searched, the person to be
searched, and the property to be seized.43 Still, Gates did not go
so far as to interpret the requirement of specificity as a
requirement of accuracy in search warrant affidavits.
Franks predated the totality of the circumstances test, but
the narrow scope of the decision was largely a product of the
Court's attention to the sentiment found in the Gates probable
cause standard.
The Court decided Franks under the
presumption that the 'truthful showing... of probable cause
"does not mean 'truthful' in the sense that every fact recited in
the warrant affidavit is necessarily correct, for probable cause
may be founded upon hearsay, and upon information received
from informants, as well as upon information within the
affiant's own knowledge that sometimes must be garnered
hastily."4 4 The respondent, in Franks, argued that subfacial
challenges would require factual accuracy in a probable cause
standard that, in its application, allows for the possibility of
inaccuracy. 45 Conceding the likelihood of this result, the Court
qualified its holding by requiring that subfacial challenges
"must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more
than a mere desire to cross-examine... should point out
specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit that is claimed to
be false... should be accompanied by a statement of supporting
reasons... [and should include] sworn or reliable statements of
witnesses." 46 These safeguards indicate that the Court was
aware of the potential for confusing the warrant issuing process
by permitting challenges to affidavit statements. To offset this
possibility, the Court created a test for subfacial challenges that
is entirely consistent with the Gates probable cause standard.

of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts'.").
43. 462 U.S. at 239.
44. 438 U.S. at 165.
45. Id. at 167.
46. Id. at 171.
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B. The Exclusionary Rule47 in Franks
The effect of the Fourth Amendment, at the time of its
drafting, was not readily discernable, and 'remained for almost
a century a largely unexplored territory' until the Supreme
Court first alluded to its exclusionary effect 48 in Boyd v. United
States.49 Before Boyd, the Court had not defined a remedy for
violations of the Fourth Amendment because injuries resulting
from such violations were not reversible.5 0 Boyd filled this
apparent gap in the Constitution by defining the scope of the
Fourth Amendment in Fifth Amendment terms, and holding
that an unreasonable search and seizure is proportional to
"compelling a man to give evidence against himself."5 1
Nonetheless, by linking the amendments, the Court simply
affirmed the guarantee against self-incrimination, while
avoiding a specific assignment of an exclusionary effect to the
Fourth Amendment. 52
Though initially questioned, 53 and
4
rejected outright in 1904,5 the language of Boyd survived, and
47. The history of the exclusionary rule can be summed up in four cases: Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), Wolfe
v. Colorado, 383 U.S. 25 (1949), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See, Dallin H.
Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 667
(1970). This discussion does not devote a great deal of attention to the general unfolding
of the exclusionary rule, but focuses instead on those cases in which the Court
hammered out the particulars of the deterrence rationale for the rule. However, because
the two histories are necessarily linked, one should not be discussed in the absence of the
other; and, in the following sections, are discussed in overlay.
48. JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT, 49
(1966). Landynski explains that the Fourth Amendment was largely inconsequential
during most of the nineteenth century because Congress rarely exercised its criminal
jurisdiction, and the right to appeal criminal convictions to the Supreme Court existed
only after 1891.
49. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
50. Benjamin A. Swift, The Future of the Exclusionary Rule: An Alternative
Analysis for the Adjudication of Individual Rights, 16 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 507, 516 (1993).
51. 116 U.S. at 633 (stating "'unreasonable searches and seizures.. .'are almost
always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself,
which.. .is condemned in the Fifth Amendment... [a]nd we have been unable to perceive
that the seizure of a man's private books and papers. . .is substantially different.").
52. Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1373-74 (1983).
53. Boyd was readily criticized for its reliance on Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's
State Trials 1029 (1765), an eighteenth century English decision on an action for
trespass, and for the link that the Court attempted to create between distinct
constitutional principles, protection against self incrimination, and the prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 49, at 55, 59.
54. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 594 (1904) (rejecting the Boyd Court's
constitutional analysis favor of a decision under the legal doctrines of evidentiary law).
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provided the foundation for the modern exclusionary rule, which
was only formally construed in Weeks v. United States5 5 nearly
56
three decades later.
In Weeks, the Supreme Court affirmed the premise of Boyd
that the use of unlawfully seized evidence at trial equates to a
sort of forced self-incrimination. 7 Couching the opinion in legal
precedent, as well as social policy, the Court concluded that "to
sanction" police misconduct, "would be to affirm... a manifest
neglect.. .of the Constitution."5 8 Precedent, in other words,
dictates that the strength of the Fourth Amendment rests in its
regulatory effect, which can only be inferred from the language
of the amendment.
According to the Court, to ignore
noncompliance with the search warrant requirement would be to
render the amendment invalid.59 As for policy, Weeks was, in
part, an admonition of what the justices considered the lax
attitude of the police.60 The result of Weeks, however, was the
creation of the original justification for the exclusionary rule:
judicial integrity.6 1 According to Landynski, "much that had
been implicit in the Boyd case was now explicitly stated. ' 62 In
time, the judicial integrity rationale became the sum of two
goals: "to prevent the government from securing the aid of the
judiciary in giving effect to a fourth amendment violation, or to
prevent the judiciary itself from committing what is described as
a second fourth amendment violation by hearing tainted
evidence." 63
Thus, in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
64
States, the Court described the judicial integrity rationale this
way: "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of

55. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
56. LANDYNSKI, supra note 49, at 62-63.
57. Id. at 390, 398.
58. Id. at 394.
59. Id. at 393 (stating:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth
Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures
is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be
stricken from the Constitution.).
60. Landynski characterized the policy addressed in Weeks with a note that "[t]he
Fourth Amendment was a living principle to which the courts must pay more than lip
service, by ensuring that the guilt of the erring policeman does not receive implied
sanction in the courtroom." LANDYNSKI, supra note 49, at 65.
61. 232 U.S. at 391-92.
62. LANDYNSKI, supranote 49, at 63.
63. Stewart, supra, note 52, at 1382.
64. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so
acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not
65
be used at all."
This view of the exclusionary rule, as a tool for preserving
the virtue of the courts, persisted for the next forty years. 66 The
Supreme Court only first recognized the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule in 1949, remarking, in Wolf v. Colorado,6 7 that
"the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way of deterring
unreasonable searches." 68 In Elkins v. United States,69 the
Court, again, hinted at this alternative justification,
announcing, "the [exclusionary] rule is calculated to prevent, not
to repair."70 Further defining the new deterrence rationale, the
Court held that the purpose of the exclusionary rule "is to
deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guarant[ee] in
the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to
disregard it."'71 Nearly a half century after Weeks, the Court
expressed a more absolute acceptance of the deterrence rationale
in two cases: Mapp v. Ohio,72 and Linkletter v. Walker.73 In both
decisions, the Court characterized deterrence, not as the best
rationale for the exclusionary rule, but as unrivaled by any
other justification. 74 Accordingly, the exclusion of tainted
65. Id. at 392.
66. Mascolo, supra note 2, at 83-84.
67. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
68. Id. at 31. The passage in which the Court addressed the exclusionary rule
involved a discussion of the issue of the application of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by the States. The full text of the passage states that while "in
practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way of deterring unreasonable
searches, it is not for this Court to condemn as falling below the minimal standards
assured by the Due Process Clause a State's reliance upon other methods which, if
consistently enforced, would be equally effective."
69. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
70. Id. at 217.
71. Id.
72. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
73. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
74. Both Mapp and Linkletter addressed the deterrence rationale in the context of
application of the exclusionary rule by the states. See 367 U.S. at 648 (stating "[t]his
Court has.. .required of federal law officers a strict adherence to that command which
this Court has held to be a clear, specific, and constitutionally required-even if
judicially implied-deterrent safeguard. .. ."); 381 U.S. at 633-45 (stating:
[w]e [ I affirmatively found that the exclusionary rule was "an essential part of
both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments" and the only effective remedy
for the protection of rights under the Fourth Amendment; that it would stop
the needless "shopping around" that was causing conflict between the federal
and state courts... [;] that it would withdraw the invitation which Wolf
extended to federal officers to step across the street to the state's attorney with
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evidence, under Linkletter, is "the only effective deterrent to
lawless police action." 75 With this statement, the deterrence
rationale became permanently embedded in the exclusionary
rule definition.
Still, these arguments in support of the deterrence rationale
have not escaped criticism.
In Irvine v. California,76 for
example, the Supreme Court announced:
What actual experience teaches we really do not know.
Our cases evidence the fact that the federal rule of
exclusion and our reversal of conviction for its violation
are not sanctions which put an end to illegal search and
seizure ....There is no reliable evidence known to us that
inhabitants of those states which exclude the evidence
suffer less from lawless77 searches and seizures than those
of states that admit it.
However, such remarks have yet to sink the deterrence
rationale. Indeed, Terry v. Ohio,78 decided twenty years after
Wolf, included one of the more resolute explanations of
deterrence. Terry involved the seizure of concealed weapons
during a pat down search of the defendants. Affirming the trial
court's finding of a distinction between an "investigatory 'stop"
and "'frisk[,]' and an arrest and "full-blown search for evidence,"
the Court held that the former type of search was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment if executed under the reasonable
conclusion that the searched person was armed and dangerous,
and that such an action was necessary to protect the searching
officer. 79 The Court noted, in the opening of the opinion, that
their illegal evidence, thus eliminating a practice which tended to destroy the
entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people
rest; that it would promote state-federal cooperation in law enforcement by
rejecting the double standard of admissibility of illegal evidence which tends to
breed suspicion among the officers, encourages disobedience to the
Constitution on the part of all the participants and violates "the imperative of
judicial integrity.") (citing Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961); Mapp, 367
U.S. at 657-660).
75. 381 U.S. at 636.
76. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
77. Id. at 135-36. Criticism of the deterrence rationale has also found a niche in
the academic community. As one example of this trend, Oaks conducted a study, now
more than thirty years old, which addressed concerns about the validity of the
deterrence rationale in which he argued that prior to the study, proponents of the
deterrence rationale had failed to offer evidence of a deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule. In turn, Oaks introduced statistical data tending to show that illegal searches and
seizures occurred most often in weapons and narcotics investigations, while data
supporting the deterrent effect was lacking. See Oaks, supra note 47, at 666-67.
78. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
79. Id. at 30-31.
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"the rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment has been recognized as a principle mode of
discouraging lawless police conduct. Thus, its major thrust is a
deterrent one... [,] and experience has taught that it is the only
effective deterrent to police misconduct in the criminal context,
and that without it the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures would be a mere 'form of
words'."8 0
As these decisions make clear, the Supreme Court views the
deterrence rationale as a mainstay of the exclusionary rule; and,
in any given case, the rule will be applied within parameters
defined by the need to deter police misconduct. 8 ' This reading of
the exclusionary rule also carried significant weight in Franks v.
Delaware.8 2
The respondents in Franks argued that the
exclusionary rule "is not a personal constitutional right, but only
a
judicially
created
remedy
extended
where
its
'8 3
benefit.. .promises to outweigh the societal cost of its use.
Satisfied that an intent requirement would not totally
undermine subfacial challenges, the Court concluded that a
veracity hearing would proceed only upon a preliminary showing
of an affiant's deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the
truth.8 4 By requiring this showing of intent, the Court ensured
that subfacial challenges would only proceed when the conduct
of affiants is suspect. Thus, under Franks, and consistent with
the deterrence rationale, subfacial challenges extend to affiants,
but not informants. To take these challenges any further, would
be to breach the scope of the exclusionary rule.
III. THE PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD AND EXCLUSIONARY RULE
IN MONTANA'S APPLICATION OF THE FRANKS TEST

Montana first applied the Franks test in State v. Sykes,8 5 a
drug possession case in which police discovered marijuana in a
defendant's home while executing a search warrant issued on
the basis of a report made by a confidential informant.8 6 The
80. Id. at 12 (citing Linkletter, 381 U.S. 618, 629-35; Mapp, 367 U.S. 643, 655).
81. See Mascolo, supra, note 2, at 87.
82. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
83. 438 U.S. 154, 165-66 (1978).
84. See id. at 170-71.
85. 194 Mont. 14, 663 P.2d 691 (1983) (overruled on other grounds by State v.
Long, 216 Mont. 65, 700 P.2d 153 (1985)).
86. See id. at 16, 663 P.2d at 692. However, in at least one pre-Franks decision,
the court held that probable cause to issue a warrant requires accurate information. See
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affidavit for the warrant indicated that the informant had
noticed several bags of marijuana in the back bedroom of a
trailer owned by the defendant.87 On a motion to quash the
warrant, the trial court ordered the State to disclose the identity
of the informant, the purpose being to resolve uncertainties
raised by the defendant's claim that nobody had entered the
house other than the defendant or his family. The State
responded by appealing to the Montana Supreme Court for a
88
writ of supervisory control.
Applying the Franks test, the court vacated the order, and
held that the defendant failed to make even a preliminary
showing that the statements contained in the affidavit were
false. The defendant had alleged only that "there 'were no
persons in [his] residence not known' to him and that it would
have been 'unlikely' that anyone would have seen the
contraband."8 9 According to the court, "statements do not
preclude the possibility that a person known to defendant was in
fact in his residence by invitation, saw the contraband, and
reported that fact to the authorities." 90 Rather, for the issuing
magistrate, the significant issue was not the truthfulness of the
informant's report, but the sincerity of the affiant's "recitation"
of the report. 91 The court concluded that, because scrutiny of the
good faith of informants would require unreasonable and
impractical investigative efforts on the part of police, 92 "such a
routine challenge as that presented by defendant would
hamstring the effective operation of law enforcement
93
agencies."
The court affirmed, and reaffirmed, Sykes a decade later in
State v. Mosley94 and State v. Feland.95 Mosley and Feland
State v. Nanoff, 160 Mont. 344, 348, 502 P.2d 1138, 1140 (1972) (In response to the
defendant's offer of proof that a warrant to search his home was issued on the deceptive
testimony of a police officer, the court held that "[w]e cannot uphold warrants which are
not based on probable cause, and probable cause cannot be established by the use of
incorrect information... [I]t is apparent the warrant was not based or issued on probable
cause, since the testimony given to support the warrant was incorrect...
87.194 Mont. at 16, 663 P.2d at 692.
88. 194 Mont. at 16, 663 P.2d at 692.
89. Id. at 21, 663 P.2d at 695.
90. Id. at 21, 663 P.2d at 695.
91. Id. at 19, 663 P.2d at 694.
92. 194 Mont. at 20, 663 P.2d at 695 (stating: "[plerhaps the approach would
sharpen investigatorial techniques, but we doubt that there would be enough talent and
time to cope with crime upon that basis.").
93. Id. at 20, 663 P.2d at 695.
94. 260 Mont. 109, 860 P.2d 69 (1993).
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presented circumstances similar to Sykes, with both defendants
failing to provide witness testimony in support of their
allegations. As in Sykes, the court upheld search warrants
issued on the basis of information provided by confidential
informants, concluding that the defendants' requests for
suppression hearings were imperfect without evidence of
deliberate falsehoods or reckless disregard for the truth on the
part of the affiants.9 6 In each of these decisions, the court
declined to clarify the underlying rationale for subfacial
challenges. While the United States Supreme Court defined
subfacial challenges as appropriate only when the intent of an
affiant is at issue, a similar discussion was, for the most part,
missing in the majority opinions of Mosley and Feland. Neither
case included an equivalent of the Franks discussion of the
probable cause standard and exclusionary rule as restrictions on
the scope of subfacial challenges. The possible exception was
Sykes acknowledgment of the logistical problems involved with
challenges to informants' statements. However, unlike the
federal high court, Sykes stopped short of suggesting that the
Franks test is valid only if it complies with the common
interpretations of probable cause and the exclusionary rule.
Nonetheless, it should not be inferred from the Montana
court's silence regarding these elements of the Franks test that
the court disagreed with the limited scope of that decision. The
likelihood is that Mosley and Feland accepted the boundaries of
the Franks test as logical. In fact, the court's application of the
probable cause standard and exclusionary rule in other contexts
demonstrates that the court has interpreted these search and
95. 267 Mont. 112, 882 P.2d 500 (1994).
96. 260 Mont. at 119, 860 P.2d at 75 (stating: "Mosley has not presented evidence
to indicate that this omission [of information regarding an officer's experience analyzing
power bills] was knowingly or intentionally made."); 267 Mont. at 116, 882 P.2d at 502
(stating "Feland's focus on the alleged falsity of the informant's statements does not
address the primary factor required for a substantial preliminary showing under Franks
and Mosley, which is that the affiant-deliberately or with reckless disregard for the
truth-included false statements in the warrant application"). But Mosley and Feland
are significant not only as an endorsement of Franks, but as a sign of the approaching
departure from Franks. In both cases, Justice Trieweiler, specially concurring,
expressed reservations about the strict use of the Franks test in Montana, and suggested
that the court dismiss the intent requirement of Franks. According to Justice Trieweiler,
a search, if based on spurious claims, is unreasonable in Montana because the State
recognizes a heightened privacy exception.
The justice added that the intent
requirement places an undue burden on the defendant to prove that which can not be
proved. These arguments, and the suggestion that the court adopt a modified Franks
review, set the stage for Worrall. See, 267 Mont. at 116-17, 882 P.2d at 502-03; 260
Mont. at 121-22, 860 P.2d at 76-77.
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seizure doctrines in a way that is consistent with the limited
scope of Franks.
A. The Probable Cause Standard in Montana
Montana adheres to a warrant issuing process that
The
resembles the formula applied by the federal courts.
consolidated form of Montana's probable cause standard is an
ensemble of related doctrines. In general, an issuing magistrate
must "make a [ ]common-sense decision whether, given [ ] the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit.. .including the veracity
and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place." 97
More specifically,
"[probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances
presented to the magistrate would warrant an honest belief in
the mind of a reasonable and prudent man that the offense has
been, or is being, committed and that the property sought exists
at the place designated."98 Veracity and reliability, though not
strictly required to satisfy the probable cause standard, are
nonetheless relevant under the Gates totality of the
circumstances test. 99 "However, a determination of probable
97. State v. O'Neill, 208 Mont. 386, 394, 679 P.2d 760, 764 (1984) (citing Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). Thus, the probable cause standard does not require a
prima facie showing of criminal activity. Instead, the issuing magistrate must only
determine that there is a probability of criminal activity. State v. Sundberg, 235 Mont.
115, 122, 765 P.2d 736, 741 (1988).
98. State v. Siegal, 281 Mont. 250, 279, 934 P.2d 176, 193 (1997).
99. State v. Seaman, 236 Mont. 466, 471, 772 P.2d 950, 953 (1989). However, the
requirement of specificity, recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Gates, is
also apparent in Montana's codified probable cause standard. See, MONT. CODE ANN. §
45-5-221 (1999), which provides:
A judge shall issue a search warrant to a person upon application, in writing or
by telephone, made under oath or affirmation, that: (1) states facts sufficient to
support probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed; (2)
states facts sufficient to support probable cause to believe that evidence,
contraband, or persons connected with the offense may be found; (3)
particularly describes the place, object, or persons to be searched; and (4)
particularly describes who or what is to be seized.
Compare with F. R. Crim. P. 41(c)(1), which provides:
A warrant other than a warrant upon oral testimony under paragraph (2) of
this subdivision shall issue only on an affidavit or affidavits sworn to before the
federal magistrate judge or state judge and establishing the grounds for
issuing the warrant. If the federal magistrate judge or state judge is satisfied
that grounds for the application exist or that there is probable cause to believe
that they exist, that magistrate judge or state judge shall issue a warrant
identifying the property or person to be seized and naming or describing the
person or place to be searched. The finding of probable cause may be based
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cause does not require facts sufficient to make a prima facie
showing of criminal activity; the issuing magistrate need only
determine that there is a probability of such activity." 100 In
turn, the burden on appellate courts "is simply to ensure that
the magistrate or lower court had a substantial basis for
concluding that probable cause to issue the search warrant
existed."'' 1 Thus, the standard calls for deference, on the part of
reviewing courts, to the decisions of magistrates, and a
presumption that initial probable cause determinations are
02
correct.
This being the current form of Montana's probable cause
standard, the evolution of its parts and subparts has paralleled
the evolution of the standard created by the federal courts.
Aguilar-Spinelli worked its way into Montana case law in State
ex rel. Townsend v. District Court,10 3 in which the Montana
Supreme Court invalidated a search warrant because an affiant
failed to explain the circumstances in which an informant
gained information about the defendant, and could not connect
the defendant to the alleged crime. 0 4 The totality of the
circumstances test similarly spilled over into Montana case law
following Gates. Borrowing the language of Brinegar, and
adopting the United States Supreme Court's view of probable
cause as a "'practical, nontechnical conception' [,]" the Montana
court, in State v. Kelly, 10 5 rejected a defendant's argument that
the warrant for an administrative search of his mail was
defective under Aguilar-Spinelli.10 6 Appealing from a conviction
for criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to sell,
the defendant urged the court to suppress evidence gathered
during the search because the affidavit for the search warrant
relied on hearsay.
The court characterized the affidavit
differently, concluding that any hearsay information was

upon hearsay evidence in whole or in part. Before ruling on a request for a
warrant the federal magistrate judge or state judge may require the affiant to
appear personally and may examine under oath the affiant and any witnesses
the affiant may produce, provided that such proceeding shall be taken down by
a court reporter or recording equipment and made part of the affidavit.
100. 281 Mont. at 279, 934 P.2d at 193.
101. State v. Rinehart, 262 Mont. 204, 210, 864 P.2d 1219, 1223 (1993) (citing State
v. Crowder, 248 Mont. 169, 173, 810 P.2d 299, 302 (1991)).
102. 262 Mont. at 211, 864 P.2d at 1223.
103. 168 Mont. 357, 543 P.2d 193 (1975).
104. See id. at 361, 543 P.2d at 195.
105. 205 Mont. 417, 668 P.2d 1032 (1983).
106. Id. at 440, 668 P.2d at 1044-45.
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corroborated by investigators, and that the informants, as
government officials, were reliable. 10 7 The search warrant,
according to the court, satisfied Aguilar-Spinelli as well as the
more appropriate Gates test. 08
As a key to the Montana court's understanding of the nature
of probable cause, Kelly is particularly important because it
demonstrates that the court has adopted the view of Brinegar
that a warrant need not be accurate to be reasonable 0 9
Though, in Kelly, the affidavit for the search warrant relied on
hearsay, the court determined that probable cause for the search
was sufficient, in part, because the affiant expressed a
reasonable belief that the hearsay was reliable. 10 According to
the court, "It is well settled that evidence sufficient to establish
probable cause for a warrant is significantly less than that
required to support a conviction. All that need be shown is 'a
probability of criminal conduct'.""' State v. Kuneff" 2 offers a
more recent statement of the probable cause standard, and
reiterates what was first provided in Kelly. In Kuneff, the court
characterized probable cause as a determination, drawn from
the "'four corners' of the search warrant application," that "there
is a probability of criminal activity." 113 With Kelly and Kuneff,
the reasonable assumption is that the Montana court views the
probable cause standard in much the same way as the United
States Supreme Court. That is, the Montana court has accepted
the premise that the probable cause standard is one with wide
margins, allowing for the use of unscrutinized evidence to
establish probable cause to search.
B. The Exclusionary Rule in Montana
Though Mapp is significant for its affirmation of the
deterrence rationale, its status as a benchmark decision is a
consequence of its holding. With Mapp, the rule set forth in
Weeks, and upheld in later decisions, became binding upon the
states; that is, evidence deemed inadmissible in federal courts
107. Id. at 437-40, 668 P.2d at 1043-45.
108. Id. at 440, 668 P.2d at 1045.
109. Id. at 439, 668 P.2d at 1044.
110. Id. at 438, 668 P.2d 1043-44.
111. State v. Kelly, 205 Mont. 417, 431, 668 P.2d 1032, 1040 (1983) (citing State v.
McKenzie, 177 Mont. 280, 290, 581 P.2d 1205, 1211 (1978)).
112.
1998 MT 287, 291 Mont. 474, 970 P.2d 556.
113. Id. at IT 21-22 (citing State v. Rinehart, 262 Mont. 204, 209-11, 864 P.2d 1219,
1222-23 (1993)).
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because of unlawful seizures is also inadmissible in state courts.
By affirming the language of Weeks, the United States Supreme
Court ensured that the Fourth Amendment protection would not
become a "valueless" standard, "undeserving of mention in a
114
perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties."
The Montana Supreme Court first applied the exclusionary
rule in State v. Brecht,115 noting:
[tihis Court in the present case would be remiss were it not to
recognize that evidence obtained by the unlawful or unreasonable
invasion of several of the constitutionally protected rights
guaranteed to its citizens by both the federal and Montana
constitutions properly comes within the contemplation of this
Court's exclusionary rule. To do otherwise would lend Court
approval to a fictional distinction between classes of citizens: those
who are bound to respect the Constitution and those who are not.

Were the exclusionary rule to recognize such distinctions it would
by indirection circumvent the rule established by this Court to

enforce these rights and would in fact render the
rule and the
16
constitutional guarantees it protects meaningless.

Later, the court also accepted, and-without equivocationadopted, the proposition that the purpose of the exclusionary
rule lies within its potential to deter police misconduct. In his
dissent to the majority opinion in State v. Coburn,117 Justice
Castles provided the clearest possible articulation of the
deterrence rationale, observing that the doctrine serves not as a
"bonus to the criminal defendant whose rights have been
violated [,]" but as a deterrent to unlawful searches and
seizures.1 1 8 Because the rule runs close to a triviality in the
absence of this sort of intrusion by police, its application,
according to Coburn, is necessary only when deterrence is "most
efficaciously served."" 9
The court has interpreted the

114. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
115.
157 Mont. 264, 485 P.2d 47 (1971).
116. Id. at 271, 485 P.2d at 51.
117. 165 Mont. 488, 530 P.2d 455 (1974).
118. According to Justice Castles,
it can be readily seen that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
future unlawful official conduct and not as a bonus to the criminal defendant
whose rights have been violated. Where there has been no unlawful official
misconduct, as in the present factual situation, the reason for the rule fails.
Even if it be conceded that the reason for the exclusionary rule is to deter all
illegal conduct, official or private, the application of the rule has been
restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most
efficaciously served.
Id. at 512, 530 P.2d at 455.

119.

Id.
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deterrence rationale as a modifier of the broad concept of
exclusion, thus limiting the application of the doctrine to
circumstances in which the conduct of individual officers, or
entire police forces, will likely change to conform to the privacy
and warrant clauses of the Montana Constitution.
As State v. Long120 indicates, the deterrence rationale has
even survived the Montana court's propensity for dismissing
prosecutions on grounds that Article II, sections 10 and 11
provide a greater degree of protection against government
intrusion than has been read into the federal Constitution. In
Long, the court overruled a series of earlier decisions ending
with State v. Hyem, 121 and rejected the proposition that the
exclusionary rule applies to private citizen searches executed in
violation of the privacy clause. 22 Relying on the deterrence
rationale, the court concluded that the exclusion of evidence
obtained as a result of private citizen searches would not
advance the goal of deterrence. According to the court, the
exclusionary rule would serve no legitimate end, under these
circumstances, because Montana residents are naturally
unaware of the rule; and, despite its application, police would
not be deterred from carrying out unlawful searches. 123 In this
sense, Long demonstrates that the Montana court has yet to
abandon the deterrence rationale as a limitation to the scope of

120. 216 Mont. 65, 700 P.2d 153 (1985).
121.
193 Mont. 51, 630 P.2d 202 (1981).
122. 216 Mont. at 68-69, 700 P.2d at 156 (citing State v. Hyam, 193 Mont. 51, 630
P.2d 202 (1981)). The Long majority expressly adopted the dissent of Hyam, in which
Justice Morrison admonished that "[b]y interpreting Montana's constitutional right of
privacy as a prohibition against private, as well as state action, this Court has set itself
foursquare against the position of the courts of all other states, and in my opinion,
against the intention of the framers of Montana's constitution." 193 Mont. at 67, 630
P.2d at 211. The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule provides that otherwise
inadmissible evidence will survive the exclusionary rule if police obtained the evidence
under a good faith belief that no laws were broken. Though the court has yet to furnish
a definitive statement about the validity of the good faith doctrine under the Montana
Constitution, State v. Van Haele provides, perhaps, the most illuminating discussion of
the issue. See 199 Mont. 522, 649 P.2d 1311 (1982). Rejecting an argument that
evidence obtained by a private citizen in violation of the Constitution is admissible if
relied upon in good faith, the Van Haele court concluded that the exception, at least as
articulated by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Williams, breaches the "constitutional
guarantee of privacy expressed in the strongest terms of any state constitution in the
country." See id. at 529, 649 P.2d at 1315 (citing United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d
830, 840 (5th Cir. 1980)); See also State v. Hembd, 235 Mont. 361, 371, 767 P.2d 864, 871
(1989), State v. Burke, 235 Mont. 165, 168, 766 P.2d 254, 255-56 (1988) (raising, but not
discussing, the good faith exception); State v. McLees, 2000 MT 6, $$ 27-28, 298 Mont.
15, $$ 27-28, 994 P.2d 683, $$ 27-28 (rejecting the good faith exception).
123. 216 Mont. at 71, 700 P.2d at 157.
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the exclusionary rule.

IV. THE FRANKS TEST REVISITED AND REVISED IN

WORRALL

Worrall was the first of its kind; and Montana is the only
jurisdiction to have expressly removed the intent requirement of
the Franks test. The holding of Worrall was not an intricate
one. The court simply retailored the Franks test, and changed
the game, so to speak, in favor of Montana's criminal
defendants. Nonetheless, the departure from Franks, and its
limitations, was significant.
A. Suppression Hearing
In September 1997, Chouteau County police learned about
Russell Worrall's marijuana growing operation from two boys
who had wandered onto Worrall's Fort Benton property while
hunting snakes. Eleven-year-old Erik Cranmore and his friend
Dustin Dostal told Deputy Stephen Burdick that they had found
what they thought were marijuana plants in Worrall's
backyard. 124 Burdick spoke with the boys for about fifteen
minutes, and faxed a one-page report of the discussion to the
Tri-Agency Drug Task Force in Havre. Deputy Monte Reichelt,
team leader of the Task Force, used the report to apply for a
warrant to search Worrall's property. On September 31, Task
Force officers found three marijuana plants in a ravine west of
Worrall's house, one plant near the southwest corner of the
house, and additional amounts of marijuana, marijuana stems,
125
and drug paraphernalia inside the house.
Worrall was charged with criminal production or
manufacture of dangerous drugs, criminal possession of
dangerous
drugs,
and
criminal
possession
of drug
paraphernalia. On December 24, Worrall filed a motion to
suppress the evidence seized during the search of his home,
alleging that Reichelt's affidavit for the search warrant
124. State v. Worrall, 1999 MT 55, 6, 293 Mont. 439, 6, 976 P.2d 968, 916. On
September 27, Cranmore and Dostal were hunting snakes with a third friend, Jerode
Weber. Somewhere near the boundary of Worrall's property, the boys were met by
Worrall's son, James, who led them to a snake pit situated behind Worrall's house.
Shortly after their encounter with James, the boys happened upon the marijuana plants.
Id. at 6.
125. Id. at %1 8-12. Burdick declined to record the interview or take written
statements from Cranmore and Dostal. At the hearing on Worrall's suppression motion,
the boys testified that Burdick took notes during the interview. Burdick denied writing
anything about the boys' statements. Id. at 1 8-12.
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contained several false statements, and that the remaining
information was insufficient to establish probable cause for the
search. 126 During a hearing on the motion, Worrall, Cranmore,
Dostal, and deputies Burdick and Reichelt testified about the
accuracy of the affidavit, and, specifically, Burdick's
representation of the September interview. 127
The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Worrall
had not shown that the affidavit contained deliberate falsehoods
or that Burdick and Reichelt had used the statements with
reckless disregard for the truth. In a prefatory discussion of an
additional issue raised in Worrall's motion, the trial court held
that the unproven allegations of Cranmore and Dostal could
serve as the foundation for Reichelt's search warrant. The trial
court added that Cranmore's credibility was not marred by his
earlier run-in with Burdick, and that the conflicting testimony
regarding at least one of the statements did not amount to a
material discrepancy, in part, because Cranmore had also seen
pictures of marijuana leaves in magazines. Worrall pleaded
guilty to criminal manufacture of dangerous drugs, and reserved
his right to appeal the trial court's decision. The remaining
charges were dismissed. 128

126. Id. at 13.
127. Id. at
88, 14.
128. Id. at
14, 36-45. The first statement detailed Cranmore's claim that he
could identify marijuana plants because had seen a plant at his aunt's house. Cramnore
testified that he told Burdick that his aunt's marijuana plant was a fake. Worrall
argued that Cranmore's comparison of the confiscated marijuana plant to an artificial
plant was less compelling than a comparison to another live plant. According to the
second statement, Cranmore and Dostal counted forty plants under a porch on the north
side of Worrall's house. Both boys testified that they only told Burdick about the plants
growing in a backyard pit. Again, Worrall argued that marijuana growing in a yard, as
evidence of production, was less compelling than marijuana growing in a controlled
environment. As proof of the boys' good character, the third statement indicated that
both boys seemed sincere when they talked to Burdick, and that neither had ever been in
trouble. Worrall testified that Burdick had reprimanded Cramnore twice for threatening
other children and using objectionable language. Burdick confirmed the allegation, but
explained that no juvenile proceedings had resulted on those occasions. The fourth
statement reiterated the boys' ability to identify marijuana plants, noting that both told
Burdick that the plants looked like a marijuana emblem they had seen on a lighter.
And, in response to Burdick suggestion that Worrall's plants were tomatoes, both boys
claimed that they could distinguish between the two types. However, Dostal testified
that he told Burdick that he had assumed that Worrall's plants were marijuana because
Cranmore had said so. According to Worrall, this testimony demonstrated that only
Cranmore could identify marijuana plants. Id. at 14, 36-45.
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B. Decision on Appeal
Appealing from the denial of his motion to suppress, Worrall
renewed his allegation that the Chouteau County police and the
Havre Task Force knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly
included false statements in the search warrant affidavit.
Affirming in part, and reversing in part, the Montana Supreme
Court remanded the case to the trial court to decide, again,
whether false statements were included in the affidavit for the
warrant. The supreme court retreated from the traditional
Franks test, and concluded that Worrall was not required to
show that the investigators knowingly, intentionally, or
recklessly included false information in the warrant affidavit.
According to the court, Worrall could successfully challenge the
affidavit if a preponderance of the evidence indicated that the
129
information was untrue.
Addressing the substance of Worrall's appeal, the court
reviewed each of the allegedly false statements contained in the
affidavit. The court upheld the trial court's findings that the
conflicting testimony of Cranmore and Burdick, about the
authenticity of the marijuana plant, was immaterial, and that
the affidavit accurately described Cranmore as a good kid. Less
enthused about the trial court's attention to extrinsic evidence,
the court disregarded Cranmore's testimony about the magazine
pictures because it was not contained within the four corners of
the affidavit. 13° For the remaining statements, the court ordered
1 1
a reconsideration under the modified Frankstest.
The decision to reject the intent requirement of the Franks
test was not a unanimous one. Justice Gray, concurring in part,
and dissenting in part, questioned not the substance of the
majority's opinion, but the manner in which it was devised and
delivered. The crux of Gray's dissent was that the majority
over-stepped its limited powers by "adopt[ing] sua sponte a
129. Id. at
35, 46.
130. Id. at
37-38, 43-44. At the hearing, and on appeal, Worrall also argued that
the eleven-year-old informant's unproven account was not sufficient to establish
probable cause for the search warrant. However, both courts agreed that Cranmore's
statement, that he saw marijuana plants on Worrall's property, was sufficient to
demonstrate that the information was reliable for a search warrant. Id. at 11 37-38, 4344.
131. On remand, the trial court denied Worrall's motion to suppress, and Worrall
appealed again. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that a
"substantial basis [existed] for concluding that probable cause supported the issuance of
a search warrant for Worrall's property." State v. Worrall, No. 90-641, 2001 WL 360984,
at *4 (Mont. April 10, 2001).
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concurring opinion from an earlier case and plunk[ing] it into
the middle of this case, thereby creating new precedent on an
important issue of law without the benefit of any arguments
from the parties litigant."132 In response to the concurrence,
and, specifically, Gray's concerns about the lack of precedent for
Worrall, Justice Nelson defended the majority opinion,
remarking that "there comes a point... where principles of stare
decisis do not justify compounding the error in the hope that
some attorney or some trial court will have the moral fortitude
to raise the challenge in a future case."'1 33 In short, the dispute
between the justices focused on procedure rather than the
substance of the majority opinion.
V.

WORRALL'S REJECTION OF THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS

OF THE FRANKS TEST

Before Worrall, Colorado was the only state to permit a
Montana-like test for subfacial challenges to search warrant
affidavits. On two occasions, in 1982 and 1983, the Colorado
Supreme Court tentatively rejected the limitations to the Franks
test in favor of a less mechanical procedure for reviewing alleged
inaccuracies in affidavit statements. In People v. Dailey, 34 the
court acknowledged the federal rule that inaccuracies, if used
intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth, are
excisable, but added that trial courts also have discretionary
1 35
authority to strike an "error [made by] some other source."
136
The Colorado court affirmed Dailey in People v. Nunez.
On interlocutory appeal from an order suppressing evidence
seized during a search of a defendant's house, the State argued
that the trial court's request for disclosure of the identity of a
confidential informant was unreasonable because the good faith
of the affiant who received a tip from the informant was not in
question. 137 Upholding the order, the court ruled that, under
Dailey, the trial court correctly determined that discrepancies
between the statements of the confidential informant and the
132.

Id. at

63.

133. Id. at 881.
134. 639 P.2d 1068 (Col. 1982).
135. Id. at 1075 (stating: "[if the source of the error is intentional falsehood or
reckless disregard for the truth... the statement must be stricken from the
affidavit .... If, on the other hand, the error has some other source we leave to the trial
court the initial resolution of the consequences.").
136. 658 P.2d 879 (Col. 1983).
137. Id. at 881.
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defendant necessitated disclosure of the informant's identity. 138
Writing for the majority, Justice Dubofsky reasoned that
"[w]hen, following a veracity hearing, the probability of one of
those kinds of errors [an informant's mistake] has been found,
the election of remedies or sanctions is left to the discretion of
the district court."'139 Though Colorado avoided the explicit
language used by the Montana court, these cases, Dailey and
Nunez, resemble Worrall insofar as the Colorado court, like
Montana, recognized the difficulties involved with probable
cause determinations made on the basis of affidavits that
contain inaccurate statements.
At least one other state has explored the possibility of
altering the Franks test. In State v. Glenn, 140 the Connecticut
Supreme Court rejected the Montana and Colorado decisions,
and declined to expand the scope of subfacial challenges under
Article I, Section 7 of the Connecticut Constitution.' 4 ' The court
concluded that the Franks test was consistent with the search
and seizure provision of the state constitution, and rejected the
defendant's argument that an earlier decision to discard the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule required a similar
removal of the intent requirement of Franks.142
As an answer to Worrall and Dailey, Glenn attacked the
validity of this new test for subfacial challenges. Dismissing the
modified Franks test as illogical, the Connecticut court
addressed two specific deficiencies in the argument that an
informant's veracity is fair game in a subfacial challenge. 43 At
the outset, the court questioned the purpose of a modified
Franks test, remarking that a challenge directed at an
informant's veracity would serve no specific end, other than the
production of a flawless search warrant. 44 The court warned
that by focusing on the source of information contained in the
affidavit, and not the affiant, this modified Franks test would
effectively nullify the exclusionary rule as a deterrent to police
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 740 A.2d 856 (Conn. 1999).
141. Id. at 860 (citing CONN. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1999) which provides, in part, that
"The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from
unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant.. .shall issue without describing
them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation.").
142. Id. at 861, n. 5.
143. Id. at 861-63.
144. Id. at 862.
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misconduct. 145 According to the court, the "logic or benefit that
would result from rejecting the traditional contours of the
Franks rule[,]" would be minimal because the "deterrent effect of
the exclusionary rule is not served by permitting a challenge
based on an informant's false statements. " 1 46 The court further
explained that a modified Franks test would undermine
probable cause, which is traditionally gauged by "objectively
considering what is known to the State at the time a warrant is
presented to a magistrate.' ' 147 According to the court, probable
cause "does not require the accuracy presented by hindsight[,]"
but, instead, concedes that the "factual basis of a warrant may
be inaccurate. " 14 8 To require more, the court noted, would be to
subject police to a "Catch-22 situation" in which a valid search
warrant would require an extensive investigation of the
defendant-an investigation made possible only by the aid of a
49
warrant.1
Worrall rejected these very limitations which Franks and
Glenn regarded as essential to a constitutionally sound
procedure for subfacial challenges; and, for this reason, the
Connecticut court's analysis of a modified Franks test is a fitting
commentary on Montana's departure from federal and state
precedents. The warrant clause of the Montana Constitution is
nearly identical to that of the Connecticut Constitution, and
both mirror the language of the Fourth Amendment. 150 Each
provision proscribes unreasonable searches, but neither protects
against inaccurate searches. The reasonableness of a search
and the accuracy of the information upon which the search is
based, according to the language of both constitutions, are not
necessarily synonymous requirements. 15 1 Worrall, in contrast,
equated these requirements, and pressed the need for strict
accuracy in search warrant affidavits. However, as State v.

145. Id. at 861-62.
146. Id. at 861.
147. Id. at 862.
148. Id.
149. Id.
In addition to these substantive criticisms, the court addressed an
ancillary concern, first raised in Franks, that "increased pretrial litigation" would result
from the adoption of a modified Franks test. Id. at 863. See also Franks v. Delaware,
438 U.S. 154, 170 (1978). According to the court, "[i]t makes little sense to increase the
workload and delay in an already busy system by allowing challenges to errors that are
beyond the state's control and that do not address the case's ultimate merits." 740 A.2d
at 863.
150.
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1999); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11 (1999).
151.

CONN. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1999); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11 (1999).
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Kelly 152 and State v. Kuneff 53 indicate, Montana's pre-Worrall
case law adopted a probable cause standard that requires
accuracy only in the sense that an affiant reasonably believes
154
that statements contained within an affidavit are true.
Accordingly, Kelly and Kuneff conflict with the ideological basis
of Worrall.
The relevant language of State v. Coburn155 dictates that the
Montana courts operate under an exclusionary rule, the purview
of which extends no further than what the deterrence rationale
permits. 15 6 However, a comparison of Worrall and State v.
Long 57 demonstrates the gap between Worrall and this previous
interpretation of the exclusionary rule. In Worrall, the court
applied the exclusionary rule in the absence of any consideration
of the good faith exception to the rule. In Long, the court
excused the good faith use of otherwise excisable information,
concluding that the exclusion of such information, when used by
police in good faith, would serve no justifiable end-that end
being the deterrence of police misconduct. 158 Though Long was
decided fifteen years before Worrall, the case has not been
overturned, and the number of years, alone, does not excuse the
dissimilar treatment of the good faith question. The issues in
both cases are similar enough that the court, in Worrall, should
have, at least, alluded to Long's recognition of the good faith
exception, if only to distinguish the facts of the two cases. 59
In light of these discrepancies, the question becomes: Why,
if Montana has adopted traditional search and seizure maxims
in past decisions, would the court then reject, in Worrall, the
notion that subfacial challenges should be applied in spite of a
probable cause standard that requires only objective truth, and
a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule that exists as a
derivative of the deterrence rational. The opinion, itself, offers
little explanation of the holding or the premise on which the
Montana court determined that Worrall presented such dire
circumstances that a mutiny from Franks was unavoidable. The
very foundation for the court's holding included a statement by
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

205 Mont. 417, 668 P.2d 1032 (1983).
1998 MT 287, 291 Mont. 474, 970 P.2d 556.
Id. at 440, 668 P.2d at 1044-45.
165 Mont. 488, 530 P.2d 442 (1974).
Id. at 502, 530 P.2d at 451.
216 Mont. 65, 700 P.2d 153 (1985).
Id. at 68, 700 P.2d at 156.
Id. at 68-67, 700 P.2d at 156.
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Justice Nelson that:
[a] search based upon a warrant application which contains
material misstatements and inaccurate information may skew the
magistrate's determination of probable cause. Importantly, such a
search is no more reasonable nor less an invasion of privacy
were made
merely because the misstatements and inaccuracies
0
mistakenly, unintentionally or negligently. 16

On its face, this statement is entirely reasonable; in truth,
the integrity of the warrant issuing process is necessarily bound
to its equitable application, and any given search and seizure, if
carried out on the basis of an error, would seem fundamentally
unfair. However, the court has recognized that the process is
not an exercise in fairness to a defendant, but a balance between
the defendant's privacy interests and the State's security
interests.161 For this reason, the conclusion that an affiant's
intent is irrelevant within the context of a review of the veracity
of information contained in a search warrant is simply contrary
to the court's own interpretation of probable cause and the
exclusionary rule. This inconsistency begs an explanation of the
court's departure from Franks. In turn, the answer probably lies
within Article II of the Montana Constitution, and, specifically,
the court's understanding of sections 10 and 11, and the
relationship between those sections and the probable cause
standard and exclusionary rule.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION 162 OF WORRALL

160.

State v. Worrall, 1999 MT 55, 1 33, 293 Mont. 439,

33, 976 P.2d 968, T133.

State v. Kelly, 205 Mont. 417, 439-440, 668 P.2d 1032, 1044-45 (1983) (citing
161.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
While the focus of this comment is on the reasonableness of the court's ruling
162.
with respect to Franks, a thorough discussion of the structure of the decision, and the
issue it raises regarding the propriety of adopting a principle sua sponte without
argument from counsel, though provocative in the least, exceeds the scope of this
discussion. Rather, the remarks of Justices Gray and Nelson are sufficient. The short of
Justice Gray's dissent was that the majority violated "important principles of appellate
71,
practice" by resolving a question not raised by the appellant or appellee. Worrall,
73. The error, according to Justice Gray, was all the more perilous because it toppled
nearly fifteen years of pro-Franks precedent without the advantage of briefing or oral
argument by the parties. Judicial restraint dictates that the court is obliged to "sow the
seeds" of change in concurring and dissenting opinions, from which the bar might
formally advocate adoption or modification of legal theories. Id. at 66 By "blind-siding
an issue we run the very real risk of substituting advocacy for neutrality." Id. at 1 63
(citing State v. Zabawa, 279 Mont. 307, 318, 928 P.2d 151, 158 (1996)). We may read the
dissent, not as a criticism of the majority opinion, singularly, but also as a defense of
what Justice Gray considers effective decision making. See, e.g., State v. Fertterer, 255
Mont. 73, 81, 841 P.2d 467, 471 (1992) and State v. Gatts, 279 Mont. 42, 51-52, 928 P.2d
114, 119-20 (1996) as an instance in which a defendant used a dissent to successfully
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argue for reversal of an erroneous statutory interpretation.
Characterizing Justice Gray's remarks as overly sanctimonious, Justice Nelson
cited Roosevelt v. Department. of Revenue, in which Justice Gray seemingly consented to
the very approach which she condemned in Worrall. 1999 MT 30, 293 Mont. 240, 975
P.2d 295. The decision in Roosevelt turned on an equal protection argument that
67, 77. The inconsistency
Roosevelt had not raised at trial or on appeal. Id. at
illustrated the general point that, on occasion, most justices are inclined to break from
73. According to Justice Nelson,
accepted "principles of appellate practice." Worrall,
Worrall presented one of these occasions. Elaborating on Justice Gray's gardening
allegory, Justice Nelson explained, in a judicial parable of sorts, that "[wlhen 'sowing the
seed' of change fails to produce the crop of new arguments hoped for, it is more judicious
78. The
to simply abandon the unproductive field for more fertile soil." Id. at
Defense
likelihood of a challenge to Sykes, Mosley, and Feland had diminished.
attorneys would just as soon beg for Rule 11 and Rule 32 sanctions as challenge more
than a decade of Montana precedent, and nearly fifteen years of federal rulings. See M.
R. Civ. P. 11 (requiring that, on penalty of sanction, pleadings and written motions be
"well grounded in fact and [ I warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law"); M. R. App. P. 32 (similarly
providing that "[i]f the Supreme Court is satisfied from the record and the presentation
of the appeal in a civil case that the same was taken without substantial or reasonable
grounds, such damages may be assessed on determination thereof as under the
circumstances are deemed proper"). Because the duty to advance the cause of a modified
Franks test had shifted to the court, the majority opinion was appropriate.
Though Justice Nelson correctly presumed that attorneys may be unwilling to risk
the possibility of unfavorable rulings, or even sanctions, which may result from tenuous
challenges to precedent, he failed to consider the possibility that the bar's failure to
challenge Franks was for good reason, and that the community of Montana defense
attorneys who ignored Justice Trieweiler's entreaties for a modified Franks test, did so
out of respect for the reasonableness of the procedure. This consideration is, at least,
evident in the infrequency of challenges to Franks, and its nearly universal adoption by
the state and circuit courts.
The dissent is more reasonable in its rejection of the majority's approach to
Worrall, but the tone of the dissent probably implies a more severe criticism than was
intended. Justice Gray expressed her concern in the broadest terms, and avoided the
more specific issue of the effect the majority's "cavalier treatment of stare decisis" on the
holding. Worrall, 63. To carry the dissent to its logical conclusion would have been to
challenge the majority opinion as unreasonable, a step that Justice Gray was unwilling
to take given her endorsement of the principle advocated by Justice Trieweiler in Mosley
and Feland, and adopted by the majority in Worrall. See id. at 63. In Justice Gray's
comments, we have a worthy criticism of judicial activism, but we are denied the more
relevant discussion of how the majority's judicial activism resulted in an "erroneously
articulated.. .theory of law." Id. at 66.
We might speculate that briefing or oral argument by the prosecution would have
elucidated Franks for the court, or would have persuaded the court to find enough
But speculation can breed tenuous
sensibility in the Franks test to salvage it.
assumptions, and, for that reason, should be avoided. We might suggest, instead, that
with the benefit of argument by the parties, the court would have more thoroughly
considered the jurisprudence underlying Franks, its compatibility with the deterrence
rationale for the exclusionary rule, and the court's own support of the legal theory on
which Franks is based.
Though the majority justified Worrall as requisite under the privacy clause of the
Montana Constitution, the opinion might be viewed as a reaction to careless police work,
an issue that the court has addressed on several occasions, but which has not been
resolved to the court's satisfaction. A corollary ruling of Worrall, regarding Burdick's
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failure to record his interview with Dostal and Cranmore, affords a window into the
collective mind of the court and its view of the current disposition of search and seizure
practices in Montana. In short, Worrall is a commentary on, or, maybe, a recrimination
of, sloppy police work by Burdick, Reichelt, and Montana police in general-with the
modified Franks test as the penalty. According to the majority,
[aibsent the demonstration of exigent circumstances or some other compelling
reason, the failure of the investigating officer to preserve some tangible record
of the citizen informant's statements made in the controlled environment of the
station house, will be viewed with distrust in the judicial assessment of the
truthfulness of the state's declarations made in the search warrant application
to the extent those declarations are based on the citizen informant's
statements.
See id. at

55.

But the problem outlined by the majority in Worrall is not of recent origin; rather,
the court has taken up the issue of poor police work on several occasions. See, State v.
Grey, 274 Mont. 206, 907 P.2d 951 (1995); State v. Weaver, 1998 MT 167, 290 Mont. 58,
964 P.2d 713; State v. Siegal, 281 Mont. 250, 934 P.2d 176 (1997). Thus, the decision to
modify Franks seems to be not so much an intended protest of a much used procedure,
but as a retaliation against the sort of carelessness which, if remedied, would result in
fewer Worrall-like cases reaching the State's high court. Because this is a largely
unsound basis on which to overrule solid precedent, the majority reverted to the earlier
Justice Trieweiler dissents for a foundation rooted in terms of jurisprudence rather than
policy.
The concern raised by the majority is that Grey, Weaver, Siegal, and Worrall
signal not just carelessness on the part of police, but a concerted "ulterior motive" to
disregard constitutional protections as a constraint on investigations. Worrall,
52.
Even if this possibility is not provable, the situation, according to the court, is avoidable.
Id. at 53. During the course of any interview, an officer need only turn on a tape
recorder, a step which "is neither onerous nor a high tech enterprise." Id. The mistake
in Worrall was made by Burdick. If he had used any means to memorialize the
interview with Cranmore and Dostal, a search warrant would have been denied for lack
of probable cause, and the reviewing court would have had some basis for evaluating the
statements of the deputies and the witnesses. Either way, the case would not have
reached the Montana Supreme Court.
The cases mentioned in Worrall involved similar allegations of improper
interrogations: In Grey, police failed to give the defendant the full Miranda warning. 274
Mont. at 209, 907 P.2d at 953 (holding that "the police made false statements in order to
induce Grey's [defendant] confession and thus clearly used impermissible procedures").
In Weaver, the defendant argued (as in Worrall) that police used coercive tactics in
interviews with children. Weaver, 47 (rejecting the defendant's argument, the court
noted that "[w]e, too, recognize the potential for coercive or highly suggestive
interrogation techniques to create a significant risk that the interrogation itself will
distort a child's recollection of events. However, we do not find that to be the case here").
In Siegal, police failed to make a videotape recording of a thermal imaging of a building
in which the defendant housed a marijuana grow operation. 281 Mont. at 278, 934 P.2d
at 192-93 (declining to discuss the issue of whether the failure to make a video tape of a
thermal image amounted to destruction of exculpatory evidence, the court remarked that
"absent the demonstration of a legitimate and compelling reason to the contrary, the
failure of law enforcement officers to preserve some tangible record of the results of a
thermal imaging scan should be viewed with distrust in the judicial assessment of the
interpretation of those results").
In a more recent decision, State v. Bassett, the court issued a similar warning to
police. 1999 MT 109, 294 Mont. 327, 982 P.2d 410. The focus of the court's attention in
Bassett was an investigator's failure to obtain a search warrant before entering a fire
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Worrall's modified Franks test is a product of the Montana
Supreme Court's ongoing efforts to mold federal search and
seizure doctrines to the privacy and warrant clauses of the
Montana Constitution.
The court has sought to reconcile
common interpretations of probable cause and the exclusionary
rule with the State's warrant requirement, which, when
combined with the State's privacy guarantee, provides that, in
Montana courts, searches and seizures are subject to a stricter
constitutional standard and a more painstaking review than
that imposed by the federal constitution. 163 Worrall is also
indicative of the confusion accompanying this attempt to
preserve federally created doctrines, while applying, and further
delineating, the "juxtapos[ed]" 16 4 privacy and warrant clauses.
And, what results is confusion in the court's own interpretation
of the probable cause standard and exclusionary rule.
Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and
effects from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to
search any place, or seize any person or thing shall issue without
describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be
seized, or without probable cause, supported by oath or
165
affirmation reduced to writing.

Under Section 10, "[t]he right of individual privacy is essential
to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed
without the showing of a compelling state interest." 16 6 The
Montana court has read these provisions "in conjunction[,]" so
that the warrant clause-which nearly traces the federal
warrant clause-requires courts to exercise an "independent and
more protective" review of searches and seizures. 67 As an
extension of this approach, the court has announced, on more
than one occasion, that it will apply federal search and seizure

damaged home in which fire fighters had discovered marijuana plants and drug
paraphernalia. The court responded to this mistake by delivering a decidedly prodefendant ruling that sections 10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution afford residents a
privacy interest in their burned out homes-a privacy interest that need not be
affirmatively asserted. Id. at
44-45.
Although the court's opinion about the
investigator's failure to obtain a warrant was left unstated, the court's disapproval may
be implied, given the explicit condemnation of similar conduct in Worrall.
163. Ronald KL. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-theMontana Disaster,63
TEX. L. REV. 1095, 1128-29 (1985).
164. Id. at 1129.
165. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11.
166. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
167. Mark Silverstein, Privacy Rights in State Constitutions: Models for Illinois?,
1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 233 (1989).
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doctrines only in a form consistent with the state constitution. 168
In his dissent to State v. Long,169 Justice Sheehy rationalized
Montana's "independent" search and seizure analysis as a
mechanism for ensuring that the State's heightened privacy
exception, as it applies to searches and seizures, will remain
more than a mere "toothless clause."1 70 In the absence of such a
review, the privacy guarantee, according to Sheehy, "is but the
functional equivalent of what is minimally guaranteed to us in
171
the Federal Constitution."
Until 1986, the Montana court distinguished like provisions
of the state and federal constitutions only when the language of
the former "differed significantly" from that of the later. 172
Under this "duel approach," 173 the language of Section 11 would,
in theory, necessitate the use of federal definitions of probable
cause and the exclusionary rule. While cases such as Kelly and
Long seem to bear this out, the court has, in a limited number of
cases, successfully avoided applying the "duel approach" to
searches and seizures by defining the warrant clause not as a
replica of the Fourth Amendment, but as an arm of the State's
privacy provision. The court is now generating case law which
declares that Section 11, when coupled with Section 10, is
distinguishable from the federal warrant clause, and, for this
reason, requires something other than the federal search and
seizure analysis.
Accordingly, we have decisions, such as

168. State v. Sawyer, 174 Mont. 512, 516, 571 P.2d 1131, 1133 (1977) (regarding the
constitutionality of an inventory search, the court noted that "[w]e need not consider the
Fourth Amendment issue because we view the Montana Constitution to afford an
individual greater protection in this instance than is found under the Fourth
Amendment... ."); State v. Sierra, 214 Mont. 472, 476, 692 P.2d 1272, 1276 (1985) (also
on the issue of an inventory search, the court again stated that "[als long as we
guarantee the minimum rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, we are not
compelled to march lock-step with pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court
if our own constitutional provisions call for more individual rights protection than that
guaranteed by the United States Constitution.").
169. 216 Mont. 65, 700 P.2d 153 (1985).
170. Id. at 79, 700 P.2d at 162 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
171. Id.
In support of this proposition, Justice Sheehy emphasized that the
delegates to the 1972 Montana constitutional convention intended that the privacy
guarantee of the state's constitution would trump the federal constitution to the extent
that any privacy guarantee attached to the later document is only implicit: "[the
framers] adopted Art. II, § 10 to give Montanans a heightened right of privacy, beyond
the privacy rights found in the U.S. Constitution. That aspiration for a heightened right
meant that our State Constitution would afford privacy greater than the minimum
guarantees of the Federal Constitution."
172. Silverstein, supra note 162, at 232-33.
173. Id. at 232.
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Worrall, in which the court has expressly modified federal tests,
while implicitly abandoning old search and seizure concepts.
One of the more thorough descriptions of this doctrinal tugof-war 174 can be found in State v. Siegal,175 which resulted from
the court's efforts to strike a balance between a federal privacy
test and sections 10 and 11.176 Siegal involved the use of a
thermal imaging device (TID) by police to observe a marijuana
growing operation housed inside a garage owned by the
The surveillance raised the specter of
defendants.
unreasonableness, and prompted a discussion of whether
sections 10 and 11 would prohibit the warrantless use of a TID
to observe the inside of a building.177 Holding that this method
of surveillance, if conducted without a search warrant,
constituted an unreasonable search and seizure, the court
qualified its review of the issue by stressing the importance of
analyzing surveillance issues under federal law in conjunction
The court conspicuously
with the Montana Constitution. 178
articulated this approach to examining searches and seizures
with a statement that:
[w]hile we analyze most search and seizure questions implicating
Article II, Section 11 of Montana's Constitution under traditional
Fourth Amendment principles enunciated by the federal courts
and adopted in our own case law, in certain instances where
Montana's constitutional right of privacy, Article II, Section 10, is
also specially implicated, we must, of necessity, consider and
address the effect of that unique constitutional mandate on the

174. The privacy clause was best characterized in the seminal case of Gryczan v.
State, in which the court further delineated the effect of the broader protection of
Montana's privacy clause in the context of the State's deviant sexual conduct statute.
283 Mont. 433, 448-49, 942 P.2d 112, 121-22 (1997). According to the court, the privacy
clause expressly created a fimdamental protection of a right to privacy, while any
attempt to narrow the scope of that right is subject to strict scrutiny of the courts. Thus,
in Gryczan, the constitutional validity of legislative regulations implicating the privacy
clause is grounded in, and dependant upon, its relationship to a compelling interest of
the State. Id. at 449, 942 P.2d at 122. While the Gryczan discussion of Section 10 is a
couple of steps removed from the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures,
the decision nonetheless lends itself to the present discussion as a tally of issues of which
the Court is likely to be mindful of in search and seizure cases.
175. 281 Mont. 250, 934 P.2d 176 (1997).
176. See William C. Rava, Toward a Historical Understandingof Montana's Privacy
Provision, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1681, 1706 (1998).
177. 281 Mont. at 257-77, 934 P.2d at 180-92.
178. Id. at 265-66, 934 P.2d at 184-85 (stating: "[lit is appropriate and necessary
that we address the warrantless use of thermal imaging in the context of not only
traditional Fourth Amendment principles under Article II, Section 11 of the Montana
Constitution, but under the broader protections afforded by Article II, Section 10, as
well.").
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179
question before us.

The federal doctrine at issue in Siegal was the two-prong
privacy test from Katz v. United States,8 0 which proscribes
warrantless invasions of subjectively expressed and objectively
recognized expectations of privacy.' 8 '
Finding that the
defendants' expectation of privacy satisfied the Katz review, the
court added that the warrantless infringement of the
expectation also required a compelling state interest to survive
scrutiny under the warrant-privacy review, a burden that the
State was unable to meet. 8 2 Thus, to invalidate the warrantless
thermal imaging of homes as unconstitutional, the court struck
a balance between firmly rooted federal case law and state
83
constitutional mandates.
As Siegal demonstrates, the "independent" search and
seizure analysis has evolved into a compromise between a
warrant requirement made stricter through Montana's privacy
clause, and federal search and seizure doctrines-principally,
the probable cause standard and exclusionary rule-which, as
applied by the federal courts, protect only an implicit right to
privacy rather than an explicit one. It might be argued,
however, that the practical effect of this approach is that
common interpretations of probable cause and the exclusionary
rule, which have occupied the federal search and seizure
analysis since Brinegar and Weeks, have been unnecessarily
hamstrung by the Montana Constitution, or by the court's
interpretation of Article II, sections 10 and 11. Worrall, and the
court's application of the "independent" search and seizure
analysis in the context of subfacial challenges, raises such a
concern.
The Siegal approach is traceable throughout Worrall. The
clear language of Siegal may be read into the decision, which
adopted, nearly verbatim, Justice Trieweiler's earlier concurring
opinions in Mosley and Feland,both of which rely on Montana's
"independent state right to be free from unreasonable searches

179. Id. at 264-65, 934 P.2d at 185.
180. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
181. Id. at 351.
182. 281 Mont. at 275, 934 P.2d at 191-92.
183. The court has prefaced several recent search and seizure holdings with the
Siegal statement of the proscriptions announced in Article II, sections 10 and 11. In
State v. Bassett, for example, the court noted that Montana's "heightened sense of
privacy," extended to fire damaged homes. 1999 MT 109, 42, 295 Mont. 327, 42, 982
P.2d 410, 42.
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and seizures provided for in Article II, Section 11."184

Vol. 62
Justice

Trieweiler's characterization of Section 11 as an "independent [ ]
right" necessarily implicated the protections of the privacy
clause. 8 5 Underlying his concurring opinions in Mosley and
Feland was the assumption that the Montana Constitution
requires something more for shielding Montanans against
unreasonable searches and seizures than what the federal
interpretation of Franks provides. As an extension of those
opinions, Worrall carried the same assumption. But, the Siegal
analysis was unworkable within the Worrall framework, and the
reasoning of the majority opinion suffered for the simple reason
that the status of the probable cause standard and exclusionary
rule were left in question. Thus, with Worrall, we see a rejection
of precedent which provides that probable cause can be
established despite the errors of informants, and that the
exclusionary rule primarily serves a deterrent purpose. But we
are denied a clarification of the Court's plan for these conceptual
foundations of the Franks test.
VII. CONCLUSION

Worrall confirmed that the Montana Supreme Court is now
inclined to diverge from common interpretations of probable
cause and the exclusionary rule in an effort to comply with the
explicit privacy guarantee of the Montana Constitution.
However, what is apparent from Siegal's discussion of the
Montana Constitution, is that Worrall was, by no means, the
first step in this movement away from established search and
seizure doctrines. Siegal, alone, was more explicit in its attempt
to map out this new course for search and seizure law. Nor was
the court's attention to the task of reconciling precedent with the
provisions of a relatively young state constitution inappropriate.
Still, Worrall was an unsuitable vehicle for this sort of
modification. That is., the court neglected to properly address
the probable cause and exclusionary rule issues associated with
184. State v. Feland, 267 Mont. 112, 117, 882 P.2d 500, 503. See also, State v.
Mosley, 260 Mont. 109, 122, 860 P.2d 69, 77 (in which Justice Trieweiler phrased the
point somewhat differently, stating:
Applying the right found in the Montana Constitution to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, I would hold that in determining whether
there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, false
information included in the search warrant should be disregarded and only the
remaining information considered by a reviewing court.).
185.
267 Mont. at 117, 882 P.2d at 503.
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its new test for subfacial challenges. As Mascolo concluded, "[i]f
the basic purpose of a trial is 'the determination of truth, then
that same 'determination' applies with equal force to pretrial
criminal proceedings and procedures. 1 8 6
The statement is
reasonable; and, to its credit, Worrall remained true to this idea.
However, the court's understanding of the consequences of the
modification needs clarification. For example, the court might
flesh out its thoughts for redefining probable cause and the
exclusionary rule in light of Worrall. Alternatively, if the court
declines to recognize the inconsistencies Worrall created, it
might explain why Worrall has no bearing on the probable cause
standard and exclusionary rule, and why the decision is, in fact,
in line with past cases such as Kelly, Kuneff, Brecht, and Long.
Worrall declined to address these issues; and, on this basis, the
majority opinion is open to criticism; or, perhaps, a stated
concern that, in future decisions, the court should create new
precedent only where new precedent is most needed.

186.

Mascolo, supra note 2, at 100.
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